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 Until now the adoption of consensual democracy otherwise known as 
power sharing by the Iraqis is still debateable. While many believe that 
consensual democracy is suitable for the Iraq system of government others 
believe that consensual democracy is a complete failure which has negatively 
affected the functional roles of the Iraq parliament. This study therefore, 
examinesthe historical challenge affecting the Iraqi parliament with 
particular focus on the power sharing otherwise known as consensual 
democracy. Due to this, a qualitative data was generated from eight 
respondents comprising of 2 diplomats, 4 parliament members; 2 staff from 
political science department in University of Baghdad, Iraq. Over, the 
finding revealed that consensual democracy is not suitable for Iraq as a 
system of government. The finding also revealed that the consensual 
democracy negatively affects the legislative and oversight role of Iraqi 
parliament and it is responsible for the complete failure of the Iraqi 
democracy.Discussion on the findings is highlighted with the implication and 
limitation of the study is equally provided.  
Until now the adoption of consensual democracy otherwise known as power 
sharing by the Iraqis is still debateable. While many believe that consensual 
democracy is suitable for the Iraq system of government others believe that 
consensual democracy is a complete failure which has negatively affected 
the functional roles of the Iraq parliament. This study therefore, examinesthe 
effect of power sharing on the Iraqi parliamentary institution after Saddam’s 
regime. It undertakes an in-depth study of face-to-face interview to examine 
how power sharing affects the Iraqi parliamentary institution.  
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 Iraq is one of the countries suited in the Middle-East with a 
population of nearly 32 million people. Its official religion is Islam. This is 
indicates that close to 97% of Iraqi people are Muslims, with the Shiite and 
Sunni Muslims accounting for approximately 60% and 35% of the 
population, respectively (Akoum, Zbib, & Ahmed, 2007: 477). The 
remaining 3% consists of Christians (Chaldo-Assyrians and Armenians), 
Yazidis (ethnic Kurds), and Mandaeans (gnostics) as well as a small number 
of Jews, who were forcefully relocated to Israel in the early 1950s. Arabs are 
the largest ethnic group, accounting for 77% of the overall Iraqi population. 
 This ethnic group is classified into two groups, namely, the Shiite and 
Sunni Arabs. The Shiite Arabs are geographically concentrated in the south. 
A large number of Shiite Arabs also reside in Baghdad and have 
communities in most parts of the country. The Sunni Arabs are 
geographically concentrated in the Midwest and northwest of the Iraq. The 
Kurds, who comprise the second largest ethnic group (e.g., approximately 
20% of the Iraqi population), are mostly Sunnis. 
 Politically, Iraq has adopted a parliamentary system of government 
which it operates until now. The parliamentary institution has played an 
important role such as adequate representation of the people, oversight and 
legislation. The system ensures certain degree of cooperation between the 
parliament and government particularly in policy making (e.g. each side 
must be willing to bargain and compromise in order to get some policy 
benefits), the parliament must have some capacity to monitor the government 
in such that the government will comply with parliament enactments 
(Thomas, 2004:9).  
 One of the elements of parliamentary system of government is power 
sharing which is also called consensual democracy which is described as “a 
form of governance applied in some inhomogeneous countries. In this kind 
of democracy, the right of judgment for the basic issues in the state is by 
consensus among the groups, differentiated from each other in ethnic and 
linguistic assets” ( Hai, 2006 132 : ).  
 This form of government is based on the background of contrast and 
retail among the people, and resorts to compatibility in the event that there is 
a lack of mutual trust between these powers. The need for consensual 
democracy arises in some countries due to the presence of various sectors 
and ethnicities (Amir, 2013: 135). Perhaps, these conditions informed the 
Iraqis present choice of consensual democracy. Iraq is a country with many 
sectors, tributes, ethnicities including divisions. These divisions and 
ethnicities however, have not helped the country’s political system and 
structure as one crisis or the other often crop up. Until now a critical 
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observation indicates that the adoption of consensual democracy otherwise 
known as power sharing by the Iraqis is still debatable. While many believe 
that consensual democracy is suitable for the Iraq system of government 
others believe that consensual democracy is a complete failure which has 
negatively affected the functional roles of the Iraq parliament. This study 
therefore, examines the historical challenge affecting the Iraqi parliament 
with particular focus on the consensual democracy. 
 
Power-sharing 
 Power-sharing is also known as consensual democracy which is 
described as “a form of governance applied in some inhomogeneous 
countries. In this kind of democracy, the right of judgment for the basic 
issues in the state is by consensus among the groups, differentiated from 
each other in ethnic and linguistic assets”( Hai, 2006 132 : ). As stated by 
Ghanim, (2011:138), power sharing is a form of democracy which has a 
practical application that makes it an antitheses of democracy. This form of 
government is based on the background of contrast and retail among the 
people, and resorts to compatibility in the event that there is a lack of mutual 
trust between these powers.  
 The need for consensual democracy arises in some countries due to 
the presence of various sectors and ethnicities just like the case of Iraqi 
(Amir, 2013: 135). This exact situation in Iraq where there are many ethnic 
groups, sect, and religions.  
 Experience has shown that democracy involves much more than 
voting. It encompasses the distribution of political power through institutions 
and laws that guarantee accountable rule. Whereas the elections produced a 
wave of optimism, the delay in forming a government was intolerable to 
Iraqis who risked their lives to vote based on the expectation that Iraq’s 
political leaders would quickly form a new government to address escalating 
violence and improve basic services. After more than two months of 
agonizing debate, Iraqi politicians finally agreed on a division of 
responsibilities. In other words, they agreed on power sharing among the 
political institutions.  If they can build on this agreement, a deal may be in 
the offing among Iraqis which preserves Iraq as a unitary state and 
establishes a federal system of governance that is administratively viable 
(Phillips, 2005: v). 
 In the Iraq’s current constitution, a form of political system has been 
adopted which is now referred to as consensual democracy which is intended 
to take care of  transitional phase and for a single-election session. This 
agreed upon by the presidency council consisting of President Kurdish and 
first Shiite and Sunni his deputies, the Council of Ministers as the Prime 
Minister (Shiite) and his first (Sunni) and second (Kurdish) deputies, and the 
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Chairman of the parliament (Sunni) and his first (Shiite) and second 
(Kurdish) deputies. Even since this time, Iraq has been practicing consensual 
democracy which is now operational in all state institutions (Jawad, B., 
2008). The principle of consensual democracy is depicted in Table 1.  
Table 1:  Transitional Government (Senior Position) 
POSITION NAME ETHNICITY 
President Jalal Al Talibani Kurd 
Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi Shia 
Vice President Ghazi AlYawer ` Sunni 
Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari Shia 
Deputy Prime  Minister RowschShaways Kurd 
Deputy Prime Minister AbdMetalq al-Jubouri Sunni 
Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed al Ghalabi Shia 
Parliament Speaker Hachim al-Hasanies Sunni 
Deputy Parliament Speaker Hussain al Shahrstani Shia 
Deputy Parliament Speaker ArifTayfur Kurd 
Source: Middle East Journal, 4 April2005. 
 
 Although the consensual democracy has been operational in Iraq 
since its adoption by the presidential council, yet many have seen it as a 
complete failure in resolving the Iraq crisis and repositioning the country’s 
political structure for a better economic growth. One major factor associated 
with the failure of consensual democracy in Iraq is the experience of the 
Iraqi parliamentary. For instance, it is observed that the Iraqi parliament 
since its inception, has adopted a sectarian, political, and ethnic approach. 
This is obvious in its formation of electoral lists and the election law and 
policies formulated by the new government. The whole of this event has 
negatively reflected on the performance of the Iraqi Parliament as they are 
unable to hold the government accountable in this failure. For example, the 
parliament is unable to withdraw its confidence from any minister and this 
has been attributed to the manner which the government is being structured 
and formulated. In fact, it has also resulted to the distribution of shares 
among the winning blocs. Besides, the members of the Iraqi parliament now 
represent only the interests of their respective parties rather than the interest 
of the parliament as a whole or the interest of the people who voted them in 
power. Due to this, Kata (2006) noted that the government is nothing but the 
sum of the wills of political parties and not the Iraqi parliament as a national 
institution. 
 Another major problem of the principle of consensual democracy in 
Iraq is the support of American politicians. For instance, it is observed that 
the American politicians did not support the principle of consensual 
democracy in Iraq just to help them but they did it with a view instill the 
principle of quotas as a model for political rule. This can be clear seen in the 
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segmentation of Iraqi society into Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds instead of into 
political parties such as Islamic, secular liberals and socialists. Their support 
also neglected the most important principle of democracy which is the 
principle of the parliamentary majority rule; they have only succeeded in 
making the people to be under the rule of an election winner. This 
democracy principle encourages the winner and the loser to form a 
participatory government by creating a safeguard that prevents the winner 
from having the absolute freedom of decision. Even the current government 
is a good example, it is popularly known as the “Partnership” or the National 
Unity Government (Jabber, 2009: 6). 
 Furthermore, the consensual democracy and its role have badly 
affected the legislation of laws and parliamentary oversight. This can be seen 
in three perspectives. First is the absence of political opposition because 
everyone is in power. Second is the process of distribution of positions is 
done by political consensus while the third is concern with the process of 
issuing laws and decrees through political consensus among the political 
forces. This process allows them to participate in the political process (Hadi, 
2010: 103).In all, the consensual democracy has given opportunity for all 
parliamentary blocs to have quotas in the government and this has negatively 
reflected on the role of the Iraqi parliament particularly to monitor the 
performance of the government. This argument can be clearly seen from way 
the political blocs take cover under their unsuccessful Ministers as well as 
the defending process and justifying minister’s mistakes and wrong doings 
while in the office. The political blocs are deemed very powerful to the 
extent that they prevent the activation of parliamentary control, the main 
pillars of the democratic and parliamentary systems (Al-Anbuge, 2012).From 
the ongoing and coupled with our observation, it is believed that the political 
consensus among the leaders of the political blocs has weakened the Iraqi 
parliament due to the fact that they have prevented the latter to take its own 
decisions and enact important laws. Thus, they all end up in weakening the 
parliament’s oversight role the more.  
 
Research methodology 
 Our study adopts a qualitative research technique with a face-to-face 
interview approach to elucidate information from the key informants. Ahmad 
and Seet (2009); Salkind (2009);Sekaran&Bourgie (2009) argued that the 
use of qualitative approach would provide better insight in understanding the 
way people think about issues. Ahmad &Seet (2009) noted that the use of the 
quantitative survey approach for a study of this nature drives dissonant 
responses. Therefore, toeing the same line, this study opted for a qualitative 
research technique with a face-to-face structured interview approach. The 
need for a face-to-face interview is to have first-hand knowledge of the 
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respondents on why Iraqi people chose a consensual democracy (Salkind, 
2009). The essence of the structured questionnaire was to have a clear and 
apparent focus and call for an explicit answer (Salkind, 2009). In all, eight 
people were interviewed comprising of 2 diplomats, 2 parliament members; 
2 staff from political science department in University of Baghdad, Iraq. The 
interviews were conducted once and only for 30 minutes for each interview 
and these were then transcribed, coded and analysed to drive the key themes 
on consensual democracy which are associated with historical challenges 
affecting the legislative and oversight role of the Iraqi parliament.  
 Operationalization of power sharing: Our working definition for 
power sharing in this study is refers to as “consensual democracy” which is 
one of the historical challenges affecting the legislative and oversight role of 
the Iraqi parliament. Based on this definition we probed further into different 
consensual democracy that affect legislative and oversight role of the Iraqi 
parliament.  
 
Results and Discussions: The effect of consensual democracy on the 
Parliament function roles.  
 Our objective is to examine the effect of consensual democracy on 
the legislative and oversight role of the Iraqi parliament. From the 
interviews, all the respondents affirmed that consensual democracy is an 
historical challenge which has been with Iraq as a country. They confirmed 
that consensual democracy is negatively impacting on the Iraqi 
parliamentary legislative and oversight roles.  
 Our interview revealed that consensual democracy is one of the major 
historical challenges confronting legislative and oversight role of the Iraqi 
parliament. According to Dawisha 2003:36-50), the absence of the political 
culture caused by the consensual democracy has affected the oversight role 
of the Iraqi parliament. The interview conducted on the 12th of December, 
2013 at the cultural attaché, Malaysia with Hassan Hashim al-
Sharaaobserves:  
“Consensual democracy in Iraq which is built on quotas at 
the political level and to participate in government has not 
been understood correctly and has not been take advantage of 
the positive aspects. For me, it is better for the politicians in 
Iraq to adopt consensual democracy as a transition stage from 
the case of division and fragmentation experienced by the 
political parties to the case of health of liberal democracy. 
But in practice the consensual democracy is becoming the 
basis for political action and everyone became involved in 
power. As well as the political forces kept on consensual 
democracy to preserve their privileges and interests, and this 
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has affected the development of the parliamentary system 
and the failure of the opposition”. 
 In another view, we found that consensual democracy has negatively 
impacted on the functions of Iraqi parliament. For instance, the parliament 
often fails to reach a political consensus in many political issues concerning 
the country. The Iraqi Ambassador to Malaysia, Prof. Dr. 
BasimHattabToama on the 16th of December, 2013 observes:  
“The consensual democracy is among the actors in the 
political process in Iraq. It has a very negative impact on the 
functions of parliament, worth noting when there is a 
political consensus among the political parties on the 
enactment of law certain, the role of parliament clearly 
shows as a legislative institution to vote on this law, while in 
the case of disagreement among the political parties, notes 
that the parliament could not vote on any law, in addition to 
this that sectarianism and nationalism plays a major role in 
determining this role”.  
 Apart from the above, the study also found that does not fit with the 
Iraqi parliamentary system)but certain conditions have imposed it on the 
Iraqi political system. Our interview with the MP, Humam Hamoudion Feb 
18, 2014observes: 
“Yes it has affected, but there are certain conditions imposed 
consensual democracy, social structure of Iraq was balanced 
and cannot pass any legislation on the principle of majority 
because this gives impression that there is an Arab majority 
or a majority Shiite control to others, so in the first stage 
would have required building confidence between the 
political parties and the culture of participation Political by 
everyone after the out of Iraq from occupation and sectarian 
accumulations, in other words, that this country should be 
run and judge by everyone and with the consent of the others. 
Consensual democracy was suitable for the new phase in 
Iraq, but it is understood incorrectly by the political parties 
that participate in the government, which reflected negatively 
on the performance of the Iraqi parliament”. 
 Furthermore, the former parliament Speaker, Dr. Mahmoud al-
Mashhadanion 15th January 2014 agreed thatconsensual democracy as not 
only badly affected Iraqi parliament but also has determined scope of 
parliamentary legislative and oversight. He reported:  
 “I believe that the performance of the Iraqi parliament is 
influenced by the extrusive consensual democracy after 2003. That 
is, consensual democracy had created the determinants of the new 
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scope of work parliamentary legislative and oversight and these 
determinants were the main reason for the failure of parliament to 
reach a consensus on legislation and supervision, consensual 
democracy has cancelled a lot of things in the constitution including 
the executive decisions and vote on specific legislation”. 
 Accordingly, we also found that consensual democracy is a historical 
challenge which is negatively affecting parliamentary oversight in Iraq. 
Expressing his view, he commented:  
 “The consensual democracy had a negative impact on 
parliamentary oversight, because the mistakes that occurred 
in the performance of parliamentary was caused by all the 
parties compliant, and therefore did not get there any 
oversight over the government, where all the parties involved 
in the government has representatives in the House of 
Representatives are working to disable the oversight role of 
Parliament”. 
  Previous study has concurred that consensual democracy 
should be blamed for the performance of the parliament members because it 
is responsible for many wrong decisions taken by the executive. As 
expressed by the Iraqi Cultural Attaché in Malaysia, Dr Hassan Hashim al-
Sharaaon the 12th of December, 2013: 
“The consensual democracy affected the functional role of 
the parliament, because the consensus among the political 
parties was in all issues related to the parliament and the 
government, e.g., the sharing of government positions and 
privileges for these positions. Consensual democracy was a 
major reason for canceling a lot of executive decisions and 
vote on specific legislative decisions at the expense of other 
decisions, adoption of a consensual political system in Iraq is 
a blow to the democratic process”. 
 Also, the study found consensual democracy to be a complete failure 
of the Iraqi democracy. Literature revealed that consensual democracy has 
led to the complete failure of the Iraqi political system. In line with this, the 
interview with a faculty member of the Political Science department at the 
University of Baghdad, Dr Hussein Alwan Beige on the 3rd of February, 
2014revealedthat:  
“Consensual democracy influenced on the  legislative and 
oversight role of Iraqi parliament, because the consensual  
have made all the political parties in one location, does not 
exist for those who govern as well as there is no opposition, 
all the political parties participate in the government with the 
apparent absence of the opposition, and this led to the 
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adoption of the style disrupt the meetings of parliament by 
political parties  through failure to achieve a quorum to vote 
on the laws that conflict with their personal interests”. 
 Lack of consensus among the political block is another effect on the 
parliament oversight role.. The presence of consensual democracy (power- 
sharing) in Iraq has brought about the failure to achieve a consensus among 
the political blocs to participate in the political process.  This has further 
obstructed the public policy and affected many policies. Al-Fatlawi (2006: 1-
29) stated:   
“The application of consensual democracy (power- sharing) 
between the political blocs is a major issue. It has led to the 
obstruction ofpublic policy, established quotas, and then 
disabled the political decisions in the case of failure to get 
consensus between the blocs to participate in the political 
process.” 
 At the interview held on the Feb 5, 2014 with an Iraqi MP, Azhar Abdul 
Karim al-Shaykhliclearlyshow that consensual democracy negatively 
affected the Iraqi parliament functional roles. This is the more reason why 
they failed to effectively discharge their functions as parliament members.  
He commented:  
“Consensual democracy has a negative impact on the Iraqi 
parliament. First it has shown that the parliament cannot 
pass any law without consensus among the heads of 
political blocs. Even though the law is passed, it is done to 
not necessarily to achieve national interest but to achieve 
the interests of the political consensus. The same goes to 
the role of the parliament's oversight that the participation 
of everyone in the receipt of executive positions makes the 
censorship (e.g., right of deputy to ask questions to the 
ministers, right of deputy to interrogation ministers for 
negligence in the performance of their work) subject to the 
political consensus.For instance, the failure to interrogate 
some members of the parliament during this current session 
due to the lack of political consensus and the inability to 
form a quorum for the withdrawal of confidence from the 
government official who is being questioned, as happened 
in case questioning the Electoral Commission and Former 
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Conclusion and Implication 
 The findings of the in-depth study revealed that power sharing 
negatively affectthe legislative and oversight role of Iraqi parliament. It 
showed that consensual democracy is responsible for the complete failure of 
the Iraqi democracy. In line with the finding, this paper argued that 
consensual democracy is not suitable for Iraq parliamentary system of 
government especially at this transition stage or period. However, If Iraq can 
build on this agreement, a deal may be in the offing among Iraqis which 
preserves Iraq as a unitary state and establishes a federal system of 
governance that is administratively viable, with a view to making each 
federated unit or region independent in terms of resources and 
administration.  
 The overall findings of this study agree with the institutionalism 
approach which posits that certain factor such as power sharing affects the 
role of institution outcomes such as the functional role of the Iraqi 
parliament. The institutionalism approach also assumed that actions and 
outcomes of the functional role of the political system of a country are 
greatly determined by their historical institutions which are then influence by 
other factors such as power sharing.  Our findings suggest that the adoption 
of a consensual political system in Iraq is a major blow to the democratic 
process. Hence, Iraq could have opted for a different political system other 
than consensual democracy. 
 The major implication of this study is on both the politicians and the 
member of the Iraqi parliament. The finding provided by this study would be 
a guide for both politicians and the member of the Iraqi parliament to re-
think on the present political system operational in Iraq. It would also help 
them to reshape and modify the existing political system to suit their present 
need. Researchers in this area of study would equally find this study very 
useful since it would stir up further research in this domain.  
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